CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AS A STRATEGY OF REGIME STABILITY: ADAPTIVE AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN KAZAKHSTAN
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS · 23.07.2026 · 27 (1) · 92-107
DOI: 10.61841/pcvpkp92 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, online erschienen am 23.07.2026. Verfasst von Sandeep Singh und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 18 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Constitutional reform in democratic systems is normally associated with institutional balancing and political liberalization. But in Kazakhstan, constitutional change has mostly served as a tool of the regime's stability and elite control. The Constitution of 1993 has been subject to successive changes, based not on any real movement towards democracy, but on the shifting political needs. The reforms of 1998, 2007 and 2011 have consolidated the superpresidential system under Nursultan Nazarbayev, giving more power to the executive branch, changing the electoral system and institutionalizing party dominance in the constitution. The changes in 2017 thus began to be more oriented toward succession engineering, to the detriment of the centralized control, with a calibrated reallocation of powers that allows for the management of leadership transition. In the wake of the events in January 2022, a new wave of constitutional changes under Kassym-Jomart Tokayev appeared. The 2022-2023 changes removed the special constitutional position of the First President; clarified the executive/legislative dynamics; and added a non-renewable 7-year presidential term. These reforms were touted as measures in the spirit of “New Kazakhstan”, but they actually did more to reconfigure rather than reduce the powers of the president, shifting patrimonial personalism to a more technocratic, but still concentrated, executive system. Based on the literature on authoritarian resilience and elite dynamics, this study asserts that the constitutional development of Kazakhstan has been an example of adaptive authoritarian constitutionalism and that constitutional change became a flexible tool for maintaining political control. The results indicate a general trend to regime stability that has been achieved through strategic adaptation rather than substantial liberal change during the eras of consolidation, leadership transition, and unrest.
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APA
Singh, S., Riya, & Ahlawat, N. K. (2026). CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AS A STRATEGY OF REGIME STABILITY: ADAPTIVE AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN KAZAKHSTAN. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 27(1), 92-107. https://doi.org/10.61841/pcvpkp92
Vancouver
Singh S, Riya, Ahlawat NK. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AS A STRATEGY OF REGIME STABILITY: ADAPTIVE AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN KAZAKHSTAN. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS. 2026;27(1):92-107. doi:10.61841/pcvpkp92
BibTeX
@article{Singh2026,
author = {Singh, Sandeep and Riya and Ahlawat, Nitish Kumar},
title = {CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AS A STRATEGY OF REGIME STABILITY: ADAPTIVE AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN KAZAKHSTAN},
journal = {CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS},
year = {2026},
volume = {27},
number = {1},
pages = {92--107},
doi = {10.61841/pcvpkp92}
}
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