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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Bad loan build-up in India: A reflection of soft budget constraints

Dilawar Ahmad Bhat, Udayan Chanda, Anil K. Bhat

Modern Finance · 2024

DOI: 10.61351/mf.v2i2.196 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Modern Finance, 2024. Verfasst von Dilawar Ahmad Bhat und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 45 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper analyses the non-performing assets (NPA) crisis in the Indian banking system from the perspective of soft budget constraints. Using a panel dataset of 105 publicly listed firms, it explores the relationship between NPAs and bank lending behaviour, particularly examining credit rationing regarding firm size and risk level. The findings indicate that Indian banks favour large firms over smaller ones, while credit rationing is not adequately aligned with borrower riskiness. However, the Asset Quality Review (AQR) by the Reserve Bank of India and the introduction of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) seem to have enforced risk-based lending to some extent. These results shed light on the systemic issues that drive NPAs, linking them to governance weaknesses and the prevalence of soft budget constraints.

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APA

Bhat, D. A., Chanda, U., & Bhat, A. K. (2024). Bad loan build-up in India: A reflection of soft budget constraints. Modern Finance. https://doi.org/10.61351/mf.v2i2.196

Vancouver

Bhat DA, Chanda U, Bhat AK. Bad loan build-up in India: A reflection of soft budget constraints. Modern Finance. 2024. doi:10.61351/mf.v2i2.196

BibTeX
@article{Bhat2024,
  author = {Bhat, Dilawar Ahmad and Chanda, Udayan and Bhat, Anil K.},
  title = {Bad loan build-up in India: A reflection of soft budget constraints},
  journal = {Modern Finance},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.61351/mf.v2i2.196}
}
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