Best Friend, False Friend: The “Favour” Rule in Comparative Labour Law
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal · 13.05.2025 · 45 (1) · 63-86
DOI: 10.60082/2819-2567.1023 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, online erschienen am 13.05.2025. Verfasst von Luca Ratti.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Employment relationships can be governed by multiple legal frameworks, including statutory labour codes, collective bargaining agreements (at both enterprise and sectoral levels), and individual employment contracts. How are conflicts between these sources of law resolved? In many jurisdictions, the “favour rule” addresses such conflicts by prioritising the source that offers the greatest benefit to the employee. This rule aims to prevent employers from leveraging their superior bargaining power in individual contracts to undercut more favourable terms established through collective bargaining. However, comparative analysis reveals that the scope of the favour rule is narrowing in some jurisdictions, where it is increasingly applied as a guiding principle rather than a strict rule.
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APA
Ratti, L. (2025). Best Friend, False Friend: The “Favour” Rule in Comparative Labour Law. Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 45(1), 63-86. https://doi.org/10.60082/2819-2567.1023
Vancouver
Ratti L. Best Friend, False Friend: The “Favour” Rule in Comparative Labour Law. Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal. 2025;45(1):63-86. doi:10.60082/2819-2567.1023
BibTeX
@article{Ratti2025,
author = {Ratti, Luca},
title = {Best Friend, False Friend: The “Favour” Rule in Comparative Labour Law},
journal = {Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal},
year = {2025},
volume = {45},
number = {1},
pages = {63--86},
doi = {10.60082/2819-2567.1023}
}
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