EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Section 15(1) at the Supreme Court 2001-2002: Caution and Conflict in Defining “The Most Difficult Right”

Sonia Lawrence

The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference · 2002

DOI: 10.60082/2563-8505.1021 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference, 2002. Verfasst von Sonia Lawrence. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Since early 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada has considered section 15(1) in three important rulings: Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), Trinity Western University v. College of Teachers (British Columbia) and Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service Commission). Both Dunmore and Trinity Western raise but do not satisfactorily address issues involving the interaction of equality and other rights or freedoms, and section 15 failed to figure prominently in either ruling. In Lavoie, on the other hand, the Court agreed that a section 15(1) analysis was required. However, its fractured approach revealed that the search for common ground on the understanding of equality rights remains elusive.The cases do not display a unifying theme. The concurring reasons in Dunmore suggest that future claims of discrimination based on the characteristics of a group of workers may get at least a lukewarm reception at -the Court. The majority's decision to avoid section 15(1) in favour of section 2(d) leaves us without much guidance in that regard. The facts of Trinity Western bring to the fore the potential clash of religious freedom and equality rights, a clash that will continue to trouble Charters jurisprudence in the years ahead. With the exception of L'Heureux-Dube J., the Court chose not to undertake a Charter analysis in Trinity Western. The majority resolved the case on administrative law grounds. Nevertheless, all of the reasons referred to section 15 values and their importance in determining the limit of section 2(a) rights.Lavoie v. Canada is the only case that directly applied the section 15(1) analysis set out in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) in the past year. The Court split badly, with the plurality dismissing the appellant's claim that the Public Service Commission's hiring preference for citizens was unconstitutional. The majority found that the preference violated section 15(1), but could be saved at the section 1 stage of analysis. Justice Arbour and LeBel J., each writing their own reasons, found that section 15 was not violated, while the Chief Justice and L'Heureux-Dube J. found that there was a violation that could not be saved under section 1. Lavoie cracks the veneer of unanimity which the Court projected in Law, and provides a perhaps unexpected and disturbing contrast to the Court's first section 15(1) decision, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia. It reveals significant problems in the application of the Law test, and possibly a growing dispute about the proper application of section 1 in section 15 cases.

Zitieren

APA

Lawrence, S. (2002). Section 15(1) at the Supreme Court 2001-2002: Caution and Conflict in Defining “The Most Difficult Right”. The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference. https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1021

Vancouver

Lawrence S. Section 15(1) at the Supreme Court 2001-2002: Caution and Conflict in Defining “The Most Difficult Right”. The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference. 2002. doi:10.60082/2563-8505.1021

BibTeX
@article{Lawrence2002,
  author = {Lawrence, Sonia},
  title = {Section 15(1) at the Supreme Court 2001-2002: Caution and Conflict in Defining “The Most Difficult Right”},
  journal = {The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference},
  year = {2002},
  doi = {10.60082/2563-8505.1021}
}
Kostenlos starten →