Mandatory Binding Arbitration – Economic Evaluation of an International Norm
International Transfer Pricing Journal · 14.08.2026 · 33 (5)
DOI: 10.59403/pmxpqx ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Transfer Pricing Journal, erschienen am 14.08.2026. Verfasst von Expert Group Transfer Pricing of the Schmalenbach Society. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Dispute resolution has gained prominence in international taxation responding to a growing risk of tax disputes driven by four factors: (i) increased international mobility of the tax base (ii) non-OECD members challenging existing tax allocations, (iii) stronger formalization of the arm’s length principle and (iv) expansion of anti-avoidance rules. Despite business preferences for greater certainty, relatively few countries have committed to mandatory binding arbitration. This article’s goal is threefold: identifying multinationals’ cost-benefit calculus for initiating international dispute resolution, examining countries’ incentives to (not) support efficient arbitration procedures and discussing binding arbitration in the context of alternative cross-border profit allocation rules.
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APA
Society, E. G. T. P. O. T. S. (2026). Mandatory Binding Arbitration – Economic Evaluation of an International Norm. International Transfer Pricing Journal, 33(5). https://doi.org/10.59403/pmxpqx
Vancouver
Society EGTPOTS. Mandatory Binding Arbitration – Economic Evaluation of an International Norm. International Transfer Pricing Journal. 2026;33(5). doi:10.59403/pmxpqx
BibTeX
@article{Society2026,
author = {Society, Expert Group Transfer Pricing of the Schmalenbach},
title = {Mandatory Binding Arbitration – Economic Evaluation of an International Norm},
journal = {International Transfer Pricing Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {33},
number = {5},
doi = {10.59403/pmxpqx}
}
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