Quantifying Options Realistically Available with Cooperative Game Theory
International Transfer Pricing Journal · 16.07.2026 · 33 (4)
DOI: 10.59403/22rg7v7 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Transfer Pricing Journal, erschienen am 16.07.2026. Verfasst von Georg Siegert. Die Arbeit nennt 24 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The impact of options realistically available in (hypothetical) transfer pricing negotiations can be quantified to determine arm’s length profit splits and transaction values. This is achieved by the “component-efficient Shapley value”, an extension of the Shapley value that explicitly accounts for outside options. The approach is illustrated through stylized transfer pricing examples, including profit splits and business restructurings.
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APA
Siegert, G. (2026). Quantifying Options Realistically Available with Cooperative Game Theory. International Transfer Pricing Journal, 33(4). https://doi.org/10.59403/22rg7v7
Vancouver
Siegert G. Quantifying Options Realistically Available with Cooperative Game Theory. International Transfer Pricing Journal. 2026;33(4). doi:10.59403/22rg7v7
BibTeX
@article{Siegert2026,
author = {Siegert, Georg},
title = {Quantifying Options Realistically Available with Cooperative Game Theory},
journal = {International Transfer Pricing Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {33},
number = {4},
doi = {10.59403/22rg7v7}
}
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