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Temporalizing the Absolute: Royce, Whitehead and the Specious Present

Keith A. Robinson

Revue roumaine de philosophie · 01.12.2025 · 69 (2) · 261-273

DOI: 10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.06 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revue roumaine de philosophie, online erschienen am 01.12.2025. Verfasst von Keith A. Robinson.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Whitehead has said that his philosophy could be considered as a “transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realist basis” (PR: preface, viii). In what follows I attempt to offer an interpretation of this statement guided by the idea that Whitehead is not correcting or refuting idealism (in the manner of G.E. Moore), but drawing out inherent lines of interconnection and continuity. Absolute idealism is usually taken, in Whitehead’s case at least, to refer directly to F.H. Bradley and Whitehead has explicitly indicated his debts to the British philosopher. However, the American philosopher Josiah Royce could also be considered an absolute idealist and yet little work has been done on the connections between him and Whitehead. Although Royce died in 1916, he was a central figure in shaping the Harvard philosophy department that Whitehead praised and, through his friend and colleague at Harvard William Hocking, Whitehead would have known about Royce’s work. What is interesting about Royce for our purposes is that, unlike Bradley and other idealists, he is said to take time seriously. Although Royce’s metaphysics doesn’t include finite centers of experience like Whitehead or Bradley, he does develop the idea of a varying temporal span to overcome mind-body dualism. In other words, Royce generalizes the idea of a “specious present” that expands and contracts in ways that resemble Whitehead’s own accounts of perception. Indeed, Royce claims that his temporalism stretches all the way to the Absolute, setting him apart from other idealists. In this paper I will explore these shared ideas on time and the specious present. I will begin by laying out the problem of the specious present and how both Whitehead and Royce respond to it. I will first outline the similarities in their response before moving on to focus on their disagreements relating to the reality of the temporal. These disagreements revolve fundamentally around immediate experience and whether temporal relations, especially the emergence of the new, are part of feeling. Finally, I will try to draw out the implications these accounts have for their respective understandings of the absolute or the eternal. My central claim will be that for Whitehead the “transformation of absolute idealism onto a realist basis” involves fully temporalizing the Absolute, which we do not find in Royce.

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APA

Robinson, K. A. (2025). Temporalizing the Absolute: Royce, Whitehead and the Specious Present. Revue roumaine de philosophie, 69(2), 261-273. https://doi.org/10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.06

Vancouver

Robinson KA. Temporalizing the Absolute: Royce, Whitehead and the Specious Present. Revue roumaine de philosophie. 2025;69(2):261-273. doi:10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.06

BibTeX
@article{Robinson2025,
  author = {Robinson, Keith A.},
  title = {Temporalizing the Absolute: Royce, Whitehead and the Specious Present},
  journal = {Revue roumaine de philosophie},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {69},
  number = {2},
  pages = {261--273},
  doi = {10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.06}
}
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