The Problem of Relations and the Notion of Contrast in Whitehead’s Critique of Bradley
Revue roumaine de philosophie · 01.12.2025 · 69 (2) · 243-260
DOI: 10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.05 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revue roumaine de philosophie, online erschienen am 01.12.2025. Verfasst von Marco Bonutto.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In recent decades, the concept of relation has come to occupy an increasingly central place in the philosophical discourse, both in the continental and the analytic traditions. A particularly significant development has been the redefinition of the longstanding conflict between realism and relativism. The way in which relations intervene in the construction of the link between subjectivity and objectivity has given rise to a plurality of divergent ontological perspectives: some privilege the internal nature of relations, conceiving them as structurally constitutive of the terms they connect, highlighting the mutual entanglement and interpenetration of the subject’s noetic activity and the objective world (Latour; Gabriel); others insist on their external character, preserving the ontological autonomy of the objects involved and insisting on the independence of reality from perceiving subjects (DeLanda; Harman). Nevertheless, despite the centrality assumed by this notion in many contemporary theoretical constellations, the concept of relation remains elusive, if not problematic. A rigorous conceptualization of its meaning often yields unforeseen consequences; consequences that can expose the fragility of the ontologies constructed upon it, to the extent that the new relational frameworks run the risk of falling prey to hypothesis insufficiently tempered by critical caution. A revealing instance of this dynamic can be found in the historical reconstruction of two philosophical perspectives that are at once similar and, in key respects, complementary: those of F.H. Bradley and A.N. Whitehead. While the latter represents an unreserved expansion of the concept of relation within an ontological framework, the former constitute a rigorous logical and metaphysical critique animated by uncompromised scepticism. The present analysis focuses on Whitehead’s response to the problem of relations as posed by Bradley, aiming both at assessing the exegetical accuracy of Whitehead’s interpretation, and at evaluating the validity of the philosophy of organism on the basis of a correct framing of Bradley’s considerations. The article is divided into four parts. In the first, I outline the essential features of Bradley’s critique of relations. The second addresses Whitehead’s critical reworking of Bradley’s theses, with particular focus on the Whiteheadian distinction between “relations” and “contrasts”. In this section, I highlight the limitations of Whitehead’s interpretation, arguing that it fails to offer a satisfactory solution to the problem raised by Bradley. The third part explores the hypothesis of a structural similarity between the Bradleyan and Whiteheadian systems, concluding that their divergence lies in the differing cognitive power attributed to the experiencing subject. Finally, in the fourth part, I draw the consequences of Bradley’s critique for the philosophy of organism, pointing out the difficulties Whitehead would face were Bradley’s sceptical considerations proven to be valid.
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APA
Bonutto, M. (2025). The Problem of Relations and the Notion of Contrast in Whitehead’s Critique of Bradley. Revue roumaine de philosophie, 69(2), 243-260. https://doi.org/10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.05
Vancouver
Bonutto M. The Problem of Relations and the Notion of Contrast in Whitehead’s Critique of Bradley. Revue roumaine de philosophie. 2025;69(2):243-260. doi:10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.05
BibTeX
@article{Bonutto2025,
author = {Bonutto, Marco},
title = {The Problem of Relations and the Notion of Contrast in Whitehead’s Critique of Bradley},
journal = {Revue roumaine de philosophie},
year = {2025},
volume = {69},
number = {2},
pages = {243--260},
doi = {10.59277/rrp.2025.69.2.05}
}
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