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Open Access · CC BY-SA 4.0

From Rights to Oversight: Coalition Competition and Institutional Design in UU PDP No. 27/2022

Aurellia Shinta Purnamasari, Arry Bainus, Caroline Paskarina

Journal of Law and Social Politics · 28.07.2026 · 4 (3) · 388-403

DOI: 10.59261/jlsp.v4i3.129 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Law and Social Politics, online erschienen am 28.07.2026. Verfasst von Aurellia Shinta Purnamasari und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-SA 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Background

This article analyzes why Indonesia’s Personal Data Protection Law (UU PDP) produced a state-biased institutional design for its supervisory authority, despite rhetorically adopting a GDPR-style rights framework.

Objective

This study explains how coalition competition and institutional mechanisms produced this outcome.

Methods

Drawing on qualitative methods and primary data from the Working Committee meeting minutes of Commission I of the DPR RI, this article integrates the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), selected because it captures how competing belief systems shape institutional outcomes, and complements it with three variants of new institutionalism as explanatory layers.

Results

The findings show that competition between a governmental-centralized coalition favoring ministry-based oversight and a semi-independent coalition favoring institutional distance from the ministry under presidential accountability produced an asymmetric compromise: a partial victory for the latter through separation from Kominfo, but persistent governmental dominance in the exemption dimension, explained by path dependency, the government’s veto position, and mimetic isomorphism.

Conclusion

The article argues that meaningful data protection reform demands coalition reconfiguration, not statutory revision alone, particularly as Indonesia’s data protection authority is being formed. Theoretically, it refines the ACF by showing that stable compromise emerges when coalitions share a commitment to executive control and that the absence of a coalition option is as informative as coalition competition itself.

Zitieren

APA

Purnamasari, A. S., Bainus, A., & Paskarina, C. (2026). From Rights to Oversight: Coalition Competition and Institutional Design in UU PDP No. 27/2022. Journal of Law and Social Politics, 4(3), 388-403. https://doi.org/10.59261/jlsp.v4i3.129

Vancouver

Purnamasari AS, Bainus A, Paskarina C. From Rights to Oversight: Coalition Competition and Institutional Design in UU PDP No. 27/2022. Journal of Law and Social Politics. 2026;4(3):388-403. doi:10.59261/jlsp.v4i3.129

BibTeX
@article{Purnamasari2026,
  author = {Purnamasari, Aurellia Shinta and Bainus, Arry and Paskarina, Caroline},
  title = {From Rights to Oversight: Coalition Competition and Institutional Design in UU PDP No. 27/2022},
  journal = {Journal of Law and Social Politics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {4},
  number = {3},
  pages = {388--403},
  doi = {10.59261/jlsp.v4i3.129}
}
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