Nuclear deterrence and the prevention of war: the case study of India and Pakistan
Journal of Peace and Diplomacy · 2020
DOI: 10.59111/jpd.001.01.019 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Peace and Diplomacy, 2020. Verfasst von Shafaq Hussain. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
There are a number of existing theories of deterrence, mainly nuclear deterrence, that explain how states avoid the probability of war when they acquire nuclear power. While most theories generally explain how states deter each other, there is also a deterrence debate between the IR scholars Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan over nuclear proliferation assuring security and nuclear proliferation increasing the threat of destruction. Similarly, the stability-instability paradox provides how deterrence lowers the likelihood of war, but the minor skirmishes continue. Under these different theories of deterrence, this paper studies the case of deterrence between India and Pakistan, the two nuclear neighbors and adversaries.
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APA
Hussain, S. (2020). Nuclear deterrence and the prevention of war: the case study of India and Pakistan. Journal of Peace and Diplomacy. https://doi.org/10.59111/jpd.001.01.019
Vancouver
Hussain S. Nuclear deterrence and the prevention of war: the case study of India and Pakistan. Journal of Peace and Diplomacy. 2020. doi:10.59111/jpd.001.01.019
BibTeX
@article{Hussain2020,
author = {Hussain, Shafaq},
title = {Nuclear deterrence and the prevention of war: the case study of India and Pakistan},
journal = {Journal of Peace and Diplomacy},
year = {2020},
doi = {10.59111/jpd.001.01.019}
}
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