Constitutional Amendments and Political Stability: Do Constitutional Amendments Strengthen Democratic Governance or Reinforce Political Instability?
The Critical Review of Social Sciences Studies · 25.03.2026 · 4 (1) · 5103-5116
DOI: 10.59075/7h5a3w52 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Critical Review of Social Sciences Studies, online erschienen am 25.03.2026. Verfasst von Nasir Mushtaq Malik und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Constitutional amendments sit at the very heart of democratic governance — they are simultaneously the most powerful tool available to a polity and the most dangerous one. Whether they function as instruments of democratic deepening or as mechanisms of authoritarian consolidation depends less on their formal character than on the political conditions in which they are forged, the institutional framework through which they are enacted, and the motives of the actors who sponsor them. This paper examines the dual potential of constitutional amendments through the lens of three theoretical frameworks — new institutionalism, democratic consolidation theory, and constitutional theory — and tests their explanatory power against three comparative case studies: Pakistan's landmark 18th Amendment (2010), its deeply controversial 26th Amendment (2024), and its structurally transformative 27th Amendment (November 2025), alongside Turkey's presidential system reforms initiated by the 2017 constitutional referendum. Drawing on legal analysis and historical-comparative methodology, this paper argues that constitutional amendments are neither inherently stabilising nor inherently destabilising; rather, their consequences are determined by procedural legitimacy, the protection of judicial independence, genuine multi-party consensus, and the degree to which amendments respect — rather than redistribute — foundational rights. The paper concludes with a set of normative recommendations directed at governments, constitutional designers, and international organisations engaged in democratic support work.
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APA
Malik, N. M., Intizar, M., & Akhtar, M. S. (2026). Constitutional Amendments and Political Stability: Do Constitutional Amendments Strengthen Democratic Governance or Reinforce Political Instability?. The Critical Review of Social Sciences Studies, 4(1), 5103-5116. https://doi.org/10.59075/7h5a3w52
Vancouver
Malik NM, Intizar M, Akhtar MS. Constitutional Amendments and Political Stability: Do Constitutional Amendments Strengthen Democratic Governance or Reinforce Political Instability?. The Critical Review of Social Sciences Studies. 2026;4(1):5103-5116. doi:10.59075/7h5a3w52
BibTeX
@article{Malik2026,
author = {Malik, Nasir Mushtaq and Intizar, Mahnoor and Akhtar, Muhammad Shaheer},
title = {Constitutional Amendments and Political Stability: Do Constitutional Amendments Strengthen Democratic Governance or Reinforce Political Instability?},
journal = {The Critical Review of Social Sciences Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {4},
number = {1},
pages = {5103--5116},
doi = {10.59075/7h5a3w52}
}
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