Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game
Journal of Information Economics · 2024
DOI: 10.58567/jie02020003 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Information Economics, 2024. Verfasst von Pierre Dehez und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 28 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We generalize the 3-player game introduced by Mêgnigbêto (2018) to analyze the synergies existing between universities, the industry and the government in the Triple Helix, a model of research and innovation introduced by Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (1995). We consider situations involving any number of actors and we allow for a differentiation of their contributions. The resulting game has nonnegative Harsanyi dividends, implying its convexity. The relative size of the core measures the extent of the synergies and the Shapley value measures the contribution of each actor to these synergies. Incidentally, the resulting game lends itself to a wide range of applications.
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APA
Dehez, P., & Mêgnigbêto, E. (2024). Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game. Journal of Information Economics. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02020003
Vancouver
Dehez P, Mêgnigbêto E. Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game. Journal of Information Economics. 2024. doi:10.58567/jie02020003
BibTeX
@article{Dehez2024,
author = {Dehez, Pierre and Mêgnigbêto, Eustache},
title = {Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game},
journal = {Journal of Information Economics},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.58567/jie02020003}
}
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