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Confirmation and Inquisitive Invariance

Nathan Lauffer

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · 2025 · 12 (4) · 219-225

DOI: 10.5840/tht202662663 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von Nathan Lauffer. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

It is often thought that the phenomenon of rational inquiry for the sake of confirmation poses a challenge for Friedman’s “Don’t Believe and Inquire” norm (DBI). It is also often thought that, insofar as that phenomenon really does pose this challenge, it also challenges the claim that inquiry is essentially question-directed and driven by interrogative attitudes. This paper develops a new argument against DBI grounded in the phenomenon of confirmation-driven inquiry. This argument can presuppose that interrogative attitudes are essential to inquiry.

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APA

Lauffer, N. (2025). Confirmation and Inquisitive Invariance. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 12(4), 219-225. https://doi.org/10.5840/tht202662663

Vancouver

Lauffer N. Confirmation and Inquisitive Invariance. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2025;12(4):219-225. doi:10.5840/tht202662663

BibTeX
@article{Lauffer2025,
  author = {Lauffer, Nathan},
  title = {Confirmation and Inquisitive Invariance},
  journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {12},
  number = {4},
  pages = {219--225},
  doi = {10.5840/tht202662663}
}
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