Causal Closure and Dualism Without Overdetermination or Epiphenomenalism
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · 2025 · 12 (4) · 226-235
DOI: 10.5840/tht202642959 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von Alexander R. Pruss und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We show that there is a version of dualism—and even of substance dualism—on which (a) the physical is causally closed, (b) there is no systemic overdetermination, (c) mental states are not physical states, and yet (d) mental states have physical effects. This shows that commonly-made claims about dualism about causal closure are not quite correct. The theory offered can be seen as a version of Aquinas’s theory of sensory consciousness, where sensory consciousness is partly constituted by the soul’s informing of the body and partly by the states of physical organs.
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APA
Pruss, A. R., & Rickabaugh, B. (2025). Causal Closure and Dualism Without Overdetermination or Epiphenomenalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 12(4), 226-235. https://doi.org/10.5840/tht202642959
Vancouver
Pruss AR, Rickabaugh B. Causal Closure and Dualism Without Overdetermination or Epiphenomenalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2025;12(4):226-235. doi:10.5840/tht202642959
BibTeX
@article{Pruss2025,
author = {Pruss, Alexander R. and Rickabaugh, Brandon},
title = {Causal Closure and Dualism Without Overdetermination or Epiphenomenalism},
journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2025},
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {226--235},
doi = {10.5840/tht202642959}
}
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