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Causal Closure and Dualism Without Overdetermination or Epiphenomenalism

Alexander R. Pruss, Brandon Rickabaugh

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · 2025 · 12 (4) · 226-235

DOI: 10.5840/tht202642959 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von Alexander R. Pruss und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We show that there is a version of dualism—and even of substance dualism—on which (a) the physical is causally closed, (b) there is no systemic overdetermination, (c) mental states are not physical states, and yet (d) mental states have physical effects. This shows that commonly-made claims about dualism about causal closure are not quite correct. The theory offered can be seen as a version of Aquinas’s theory of sensory consciousness, where sensory consciousness is partly constituted by the soul’s informing of the body and partly by the states of physical organs.

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APA

Pruss, A. R., & Rickabaugh, B. (2025). Causal Closure and Dualism Without Overdetermination or Epiphenomenalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 12(4), 226-235. https://doi.org/10.5840/tht202642959

Vancouver

Pruss AR, Rickabaugh B. Causal Closure and Dualism Without Overdetermination or Epiphenomenalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2025;12(4):226-235. doi:10.5840/tht202642959

BibTeX
@article{Pruss2025,
  author = {Pruss, Alexander R. and Rickabaugh, Brandon},
  title = {Causal Closure and Dualism Without Overdetermination or Epiphenomenalism},
  journal = {Thought: A Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {12},
  number = {4},
  pages = {226--235},
  doi = {10.5840/tht202642959}
}
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