Artificial Systems
Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology · 2026 · 30 (2) · 207-226
DOI: 10.5840/techne2026610225 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 2026. Verfasst von Fabio Tollon. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper argues for a re-framing of debates about artificial agency by drawing on resources from action theory and neo-ascriptivism. Standard discussions ask whether artificial systems really are agents, typically by appealing to conditions such as intentionality, the right kind of mental states, or sufficient independence from humans. I suggest that this framing is misguided. Agency is not something “out there” awaiting discovery. Instead, it is ascriptive and tied to our practices for holding agents responsible for what they do. This shift has three payoffs: it reorients inquiry towards the practical integration of AI systems into social life, offers a new angle on so-called “responsibility gaps,” and supports socio-technical approaches to artificial agents. While I maintain that these artificial systems are not in fact agents, the ascriptivist framework provides us with a different set of questions to ask about agency, questions that are better suited for our technologically-mediated world.
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APA
Tollon, F. (2026). Artificial Systems. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 30(2), 207-226. https://doi.org/10.5840/techne2026610225
Vancouver
Tollon F. Artificial Systems. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology. 2026;30(2):207-226. doi:10.5840/techne2026610225
BibTeX
@article{Tollon2026,
author = {Tollon, Fabio},
title = {Artificial Systems},
journal = {Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {2},
pages = {207--226},
doi = {10.5840/techne2026610225}
}
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