A Not-So-Minimal Self?
Studia Phaenomenologica · 2026 · 26 · 213-235
DOI: 10.5840/studphaen20262611 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Studia Phaenomenologica, 2026. Verfasst von Agustina María Lombardi.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper reinterprets the notion of the minimal self, usually identified with the core and experiential self, within phenomenological psychiatry. It criticises the thesis asserting the immutability of the minimal self, positing that this dimension comprises two distinct levels: a more formal, immutable level and a more robust level susceptible to change. In the first section, I show how contemporary phenomenologists identify the minimal self as the experiential and core self. In the second, I question the claim of the minimal self ’s invariability by exploring phenomenological insights into schizophrenia and critiques related to borderline personality disorder. Finally, I advance a nuanced distinction within the core self, arguing that while the more minimal aspect remains stable across psychopathological conditions, the less minimal aspect is vulnerable to alteration.
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APA
Lombardi, A. M. (2026). A Not-So-Minimal Self?. Studia Phaenomenologica, 26, 213-235. https://doi.org/10.5840/studphaen20262611
Vancouver
Lombardi AM. A Not-So-Minimal Self?. Studia Phaenomenologica. 2026;26:213-235. doi:10.5840/studphaen20262611
BibTeX
@article{Lombardi2026,
author = {Lombardi, Agustina María},
title = {A Not-So-Minimal Self?},
journal = {Studia Phaenomenologica},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
pages = {213--235},
doi = {10.5840/studphaen20262611}
}
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