The “second Enlightenment”: Rortyan or Hegelian?
Philosophical Topics · 2025 · 53 (1) · 83-105
DOI: 10.5840/philtopics20255314 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Topics, 2025. Verfasst von Samuel Vitel.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper explores Richard Rorty’s conception of a “second Enlightenment,” a project aiming to extend the Kantian ideal of self-determination from the moral to the epistemic sphere by rejecting any deference to objective, non-human authority. Rorty’s anti-authoritarian pragmatism proposes that knowledge should be understood as a social practice governed by intersubjective justification rather than correspondence to an independent reality. However, such a position risks collapsing into either communal conformity or subjective arbitrariness, undermining the very ideal of autonomyit purports to further realize. Thinkers of the “Pittsburgh School,” notably Robert Brandom and John McDowell, respond by offering a Hegelian addendum to Rorty’s “second Enlightenment”capableof integrating objective constraint within the self-determination of thought. The paper shows that this was indeed Hegel’s goal in both pursuing and correcting Kant’s Enlightenment project.
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APA
Vitel, S. (2025). The “second Enlightenment”: Rortyan or Hegelian?. Philosophical Topics, 53(1), 83-105. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20255314
Vancouver
Vitel S. The “second Enlightenment”: Rortyan or Hegelian?. Philosophical Topics. 2025;53(1):83-105. doi:10.5840/philtopics20255314
BibTeX
@article{Vitel2025,
author = {Vitel, Samuel},
title = {The “second Enlightenment”: Rortyan or Hegelian?},
journal = {Philosophical Topics},
year = {2025},
volume = {53},
number = {1},
pages = {83--105},
doi = {10.5840/philtopics20255314}
}
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