Who’s Afraid of Transcendental Idealism? Rorty, Davidson, and Kant on the Limits of Intelligibility
Philosophical Topics · 2025 · 53 (1) · 35-66
DOI: 10.5840/philtopics20255312 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Topics, 2025. Verfasst von Lukas Nehlsen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Transcendental idealism often acts as something of a philosophical boogeyman in our times. The accusation of being a transcendental idealist is one of untenable metaphysical dogmatism. Richard Rorty also saw transcendental idealism as a metaphysical doctrine that needs to be abandoned in the wake of philosophy becoming increasingly anti-authoritarian. In this essay, I first propose that transcendental idealism is best understood, following Henry Allison, as a metaphilosophical standpoint rather than as a metaphysical doctrine. If we understand transcendental idealism in this way, Rorty should, on pain of abandoning his anti-authoritarian ideals, want to be a transcendental idealist. However, I go on to show, in his reading of Donald Davidson’s argument against the possibility of radically alien languages, Rorty stays committed to the undesirable alternative view of transcendental realism. Specifically, in Davidson’s argument and Rorty’s adaptation of it, certain views about the nature of possibility and intelligibility emerge that are, I argue, at the core of what Kant criticizes as transcendental realism. What this modal transcendental realism consists in and how it is opposed to a transcendental idealist view of possibility and intelligibility will be explained in the last part through an analysis of Kant’s “table of nothingness,” a somewhat underanalyzed part of the Critique of Pure Reason.
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APA
Nehlsen, L. (2025). Who’s Afraid of Transcendental Idealism? Rorty, Davidson, and Kant on the Limits of Intelligibility. Philosophical Topics, 53(1), 35-66. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20255312
Vancouver
Nehlsen L. Who’s Afraid of Transcendental Idealism? Rorty, Davidson, and Kant on the Limits of Intelligibility. Philosophical Topics. 2025;53(1):35-66. doi:10.5840/philtopics20255312
BibTeX
@article{Nehlsen2025,
author = {Nehlsen, Lukas},
title = {Who’s Afraid of Transcendental Idealism? Rorty, Davidson, and Kant on the Limits of Intelligibility},
journal = {Philosophical Topics},
year = {2025},
volume = {53},
number = {1},
pages = {35--66},
doi = {10.5840/philtopics20255312}
}
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