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Rational Hypothesis

Michele Palmira

Philosophical Topics · 2023 · 51 (2) · 197-219

DOI: 10.5840/philtopics202351223 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophical Topics, 2023. Verfasst von Michele Palmira. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

There are scenarios in which letting one’s own views on the question whether p direct one’s inquiry into that question brings about individual and collective epistemic benefits. However, these scenarios are also such that one’s evidence doesn’t support believing one’s own views. So, how to vindicate the epistemic benefits of directing one’s inquiry in such an asymmetric way, without asking one to hold a seemingly irrational doxastic attitude? To answer this question, the paper understands asymmetric inquiry direction in terms of having one’s inquiry be guided by a doxastic attitude, which I call hypothesis, that’s governed by the following norm: One’s hypothesis that p is rational just in case it is a manifestation of the best feasible way to form a doxastic attitude regarding p that promotes the best feasible ways to advance towards settling the question of p’s (or of any other suitably related proposition’s) truth-value.

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APA

Palmira, M. (2023). Rational Hypothesis. Philosophical Topics, 51(2), 197-219. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202351223

Vancouver

Palmira M. Rational Hypothesis. Philosophical Topics. 2023;51(2):197-219. doi:10.5840/philtopics202351223

BibTeX
@article{Palmira2023,
  author = {Palmira, Michele},
  title = {Rational Hypothesis},
  journal = {Philosophical Topics},
  year = {2023},
  volume = {51},
  number = {2},
  pages = {197--219},
  doi = {10.5840/philtopics202351223}
}
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