When Can the Doubter Be Saved? Insights on the Problem of Deficient Belief
Philosophia Christi · 2025 · 27 (2) · 361-379
DOI: 10.5840/pc202527226 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophia Christi, 2025. Verfasst von Joshua A. Pagán.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
While belief is conventionally regarded as a fundamental constituent of salvific faith, philosophers such as Louis Pojman have proposed that certain voluntary, nondoxastic attitudes may function in the stead of cognitive assent. I argue that Pojman’s alternative account fails to resolve the Problem of Deficient Belief, and that the doxastic condition of faith may be met when a modest degree of belief is held by one who has doubts. Further, if a state of acceptance may be freely chosen and is essentially similar to a state of minimal belief, then the latter may be freely chosen as well.
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APA
Pagán, J. A. (2025). When Can the Doubter Be Saved? Insights on the Problem of Deficient Belief. Philosophia Christi, 27(2), 361-379. https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202527226
Vancouver
Pagán JA. When Can the Doubter Be Saved? Insights on the Problem of Deficient Belief. Philosophia Christi. 2025;27(2):361-379. doi:10.5840/pc202527226
BibTeX
@article{Pagn2025,
author = {Pagán, Joshua A.},
title = {When Can the Doubter Be Saved? Insights on the Problem of Deficient Belief},
journal = {Philosophia Christi},
year = {2025},
volume = {27},
number = {2},
pages = {361--379},
doi = {10.5840/pc202527226}
}
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