Christian Theism and the Evidential Problem of Evil
Philosophia Christi · 2025 · 27 (2) · 287-305
DOI: 10.5840/pc202527222 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophia Christi, 2025. Verfasst von Lydia McGrew.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Skeptical theists can steelman their argument by saying that, due to our ignorance, evil is probabilistically irrelevant to theism, not inscrutable. Even so, skeptical theism undermines other probabilistic arguments for theism. A better approach is to use Christianity to respond to the evidential problem of evil. Although Christianity has more commitments than generic theism, it also has more resources for explaining evil. There are also arguments for Christianity that could potentially outweigh remaining counterevidence from the evidential problem of evil. While Christianity does not answer all questions about evil, it does limit their impact and produce a probabilistically tractable understanding.
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APA
McGrew, L. (2025). Christian Theism and the Evidential Problem of Evil. Philosophia Christi, 27(2), 287-305. https://doi.org/10.5840/pc202527222
Vancouver
McGrew L. Christian Theism and the Evidential Problem of Evil. Philosophia Christi. 2025;27(2):287-305. doi:10.5840/pc202527222
BibTeX
@article{McGrew2025,
author = {McGrew, Lydia},
title = {Christian Theism and the Evidential Problem of Evil},
journal = {Philosophia Christi},
year = {2025},
volume = {27},
number = {2},
pages = {287--305},
doi = {10.5840/pc202527222}
}
EUVIMED