Karol Wojtyła’s Theory of Consciousness and the Development of Personal Subjectivity
The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly · 2026 · 26 (1) · 123-147
DOI: 10.5840/ncbq20262619 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 2026. Verfasst von Richard Spinello.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This essay presents Karol Wojtyła’s theory of consciousness, especially its role in enabling personal subjectivity. After reviewing Wojtyła’s problems with contemporary rival theories, we elaborate consciousness’s mirroring and reflexive functionality. Consciousness is non-intentional and merely reflects or mirrors one’s knowledge. In its reflexive function, consciousness allows the person to experience his action as his own and thereby experience his subjectivity. A proper theory of consciousness is the key to understanding human subjectivity from an objective and subjective perspective. The person is first and foremost a suppositum humanum or metaphysical subject who cannot be reduced to consciousness. At the same time, consciousness is a necessary condition for the amplitude of personal subjectivity that is built up upon this metaphysical terrain.
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APA
Spinello, R. (2026). Karol Wojtyła’s Theory of Consciousness and the Development of Personal Subjectivity. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 26(1), 123-147. https://doi.org/10.5840/ncbq20262619
Vancouver
Spinello R. Karol Wojtyła’s Theory of Consciousness and the Development of Personal Subjectivity. The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly. 2026;26(1):123-147. doi:10.5840/ncbq20262619
BibTeX
@article{Spinello2026,
author = {Spinello, Richard},
title = {Karol Wojtyła’s Theory of Consciousness and the Development of Personal Subjectivity},
journal = {The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {1},
pages = {123--147},
doi = {10.5840/ncbq20262619}
}
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