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Fourth Amendment Privacy

Tara Smith

Journal of Philosophical Research · 2026 · 51 · 81-99

DOI: 10.5840/jpr202698245 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Philosophical Research, 2026. Verfasst von Tara Smith.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Courts have long debated whether the Fourth Amendment protects against trespasses of a person’s property or safeguards a person’s reasonable expectations of privacy. As technologies enable ever-greater privacy incursions, the stakes are high. Yet a person can hardly bank on a right whose meaning remains so unsettled. After examining the relative merits of the two analyses, this paper exposes the trespass and reasonable expectations options as posing a false alternative. By identifying the more fundamental principle that animates the Fourth Amendment, it explains how that principle demands respect for both a person’s property and for his reasonable expectations concerning how his privacy will be treated by others. It thus clears the way for a deeper understanding of privacy rights and for their more robust protection.

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APA

Smith, T. (2026). Fourth Amendment Privacy. Journal of Philosophical Research, 51, 81-99. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr202698245

Vancouver

Smith T. Fourth Amendment Privacy. Journal of Philosophical Research. 2026;51:81-99. doi:10.5840/jpr202698245

BibTeX
@article{Smith2026,
  author = {Smith, Tara},
  title = {Fourth Amendment Privacy},
  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Research},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {51},
  pages = {81--99},
  doi = {10.5840/jpr202698245}
}
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