Negation and Phenomenal Content in Aristotle, Hegel, and Brandom
Journal of Philosophical Research · 2026 · 51 · 109-126
DOI: 10.5840/jpr202698243 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Philosophical Research, 2026. Verfasst von Norman Schultz.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this article, I argue that while the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) remains consistent within the scope of experience, it does not necessarily apply to mind-independent reality. Central to this argument is Aristotle’s negative proof, which demonstrates that the PNC is essential for constituting significant content through the interplay of strong and weak negation. While acknowledging Robert Brandom’s Hegelian account of these negations in object constitution, I contest his speculative extension of their consequences to all reality. I contend that Brandom’s framework fails to justify the leap from conceptual necessity to mind-independent ontology. Instead, I conclude that the PNC functions mainly as a practical tool for managing the objects of experience, while its ontological status with regard to mind-independent reality remains undetermined.
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APA
Schultz, N. (2026). Negation and Phenomenal Content in Aristotle, Hegel, and Brandom. Journal of Philosophical Research, 51, 109-126. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr202698243
Vancouver
Schultz N. Negation and Phenomenal Content in Aristotle, Hegel, and Brandom. Journal of Philosophical Research. 2026;51:109-126. doi:10.5840/jpr202698243
BibTeX
@article{Schultz2026,
author = {Schultz, Norman},
title = {Negation and Phenomenal Content in Aristotle, Hegel, and Brandom},
journal = {Journal of Philosophical Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {51},
pages = {109--126},
doi = {10.5840/jpr202698243}
}
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