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Affective Commitments

Rachel Achs

The Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 123 (9) · 541-567

DOI: 10.5840/jphil2026123936 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2026. Verfasst von Rachel Achs. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This article defends a picture of the mind on which many of our attitudes, including many affective attitudes, constitutively involve forms of rational commitment distinctive to the types of attitudes that they are. Just as believing that p involves being rationally committed to p, and intending to phi involves being rationally committed to phi-ing, so too does fear involve a form of rational commitment distinctive to fear; pride, one distinctive to pride; and so forth. A challenge for defending this “Rational Commitments View” is to articulate the commitments supposedly constitutive of affective attitudes in a way that keeps them properly distinct from doxastic commitments. This article proposes a solution to this problem, in order to make sense of how emotions figure in how we reason. The basic idea: that each relevant type of affective attitude involves a reflexive—that is, self-referential—commitment to reasons’ justifying that very commitment in a distinctive, attitude-type-specific way.

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APA

Achs, R. (2026). Affective Commitments. The Journal of Philosophy, 123(9), 541-567. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2026123936

Vancouver

Achs R. Affective Commitments. The Journal of Philosophy. 2026;123(9):541-567. doi:10.5840/jphil2026123936

BibTeX
@article{Achs2026,
  author = {Achs, Rachel},
  title = {Affective Commitments},
  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {123},
  number = {9},
  pages = {541--567},
  doi = {10.5840/jphil2026123936}
}
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