The Ground of Truth
The Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 123 (4) · 241-268
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2026123425 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2026. Verfasst von Bruno Whittle. Die Arbeit nennt 19 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Suppose that p is true. What is the relationship between this fact—p’s being true—and the fact p itself? There is an answer to this question that goes back at least to Aristotle, and that is a mainstay of contemporary work on metaphysical explanation (or grounding). According to this: p is true is grounded by p. For example, snow is white is true because snow is white. The initial aim of this paper is to challenge this answer. Our strategy is to take the best formal work on truth as a guide to its metaphysics. This yields a natural account of the grounds of facts involving truth, and one that satisfyingly resolves the puzzles of ground (due to Fine and others). But this account fundamentally reconsiders the relationship between truth ascriptions and their subjects. Under the proposal, p fails to ground p's being true in every case in which p is itself about truth.
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APA
Whittle, B. (2026). The Ground of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 123(4), 241-268. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2026123425
Vancouver
Whittle B. The Ground of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy. 2026;123(4):241-268. doi:10.5840/jphil2026123425
BibTeX
@article{Whittle2026,
author = {Whittle, Bruno},
title = {The Ground of Truth},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {123},
number = {4},
pages = {241--268},
doi = {10.5840/jphil2026123425}
}
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