EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Generalism Without Generation

Ezra Rubenstein

The Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 123 (9) · 568-594

DOI: 10.5840/jphil20251308 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2026. Verfasst von Ezra Rubenstein. Die Arbeit nennt 10 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

According to generalism, the world is fundamentally general –– ultimately, there are no individuals. I distinguish two versions of this view. ‘Permissive generalism’ holds that facts involving individuals are non-basic: they are generated by purely general basic facts. I argue that permissive generalists will struggle to provide suitably systematic and non-arbitrary explanations for facts involving individuals. These problems are avoided by switching to ‘strict generalism’: the view that truths about individuals are non-perspicuous, and reduce to purely general perspicuous truths. I illustrate this alternative approach by proposing a metaphysical semantics for individualist truths in general terms. This serves both as a recommendation to generalists and, more broadly, as a case study in two different approaches to metaphysical explanation: one centered on generation, the other on reduction.

Zitieren

APA

Rubenstein, E. (2026). Generalism Without Generation. The Journal of Philosophy, 123(9), 568-594. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20251308

Vancouver

Rubenstein E. Generalism Without Generation. The Journal of Philosophy. 2026;123(9):568-594. doi:10.5840/jphil20251308

BibTeX
@article{Rubenstein2026,
  author = {Rubenstein, Ezra},
  title = {Generalism Without Generation},
  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {123},
  number = {9},
  pages = {568--594},
  doi = {10.5840/jphil20251308}
}
Kostenlos starten →