Generalism Without Generation
The Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 123 (9) · 568-594
DOI: 10.5840/jphil20251308 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2026. Verfasst von Ezra Rubenstein. Die Arbeit nennt 10 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
According to generalism, the world is fundamentally general –– ultimately, there are no individuals. I distinguish two versions of this view. ‘Permissive generalism’ holds that facts involving individuals are non-basic: they are generated by purely general basic facts. I argue that permissive generalists will struggle to provide suitably systematic and non-arbitrary explanations for facts involving individuals. These problems are avoided by switching to ‘strict generalism’: the view that truths about individuals are non-perspicuous, and reduce to purely general perspicuous truths. I illustrate this alternative approach by proposing a metaphysical semantics for individualist truths in general terms. This serves both as a recommendation to generalists and, more broadly, as a case study in two different approaches to metaphysical explanation: one centered on generation, the other on reduction.
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APA
Rubenstein, E. (2026). Generalism Without Generation. The Journal of Philosophy, 123(9), 568-594. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20251308
Vancouver
Rubenstein E. Generalism Without Generation. The Journal of Philosophy. 2026;123(9):568-594. doi:10.5840/jphil20251308
BibTeX
@article{Rubenstein2026,
author = {Rubenstein, Ezra},
title = {Generalism Without Generation},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {123},
number = {9},
pages = {568--594},
doi = {10.5840/jphil20251308}
}
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