Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard
The Journal of Philosophy · 2025 · 122 (8) · 433-448
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2025122820 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von J. J. Cunningham.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Joe.Cunningham@nottingham.ac.ukIn a recent article, Nathan Howard argues that normative reasons for action are to be identified not with facts, but with fact/goal pairs. For example, on Howard’s view, the reason in favor of me cooking the meal is not the fact that I promised—rather, it is that fact PLUS the goal to honor my promises. Howard supplies three arguments for his preferred view. In this reply I aim to do two things. The first is to undermine Howard’s three arguments. The second is to establish a dilemma for Howard’s preferred view. The upshot is a defense and development of the view that normative reasons for action are facts.
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APA
Cunningham, J. J. (2025). Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard. The Journal of Philosophy, 122(8), 433-448. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2025122820
Vancouver
Cunningham JJ. Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard. The Journal of Philosophy. 2025;122(8):433-448. doi:10.5840/jphil2025122820
BibTeX
@article{Cunningham2025,
author = {Cunningham, J. J.},
title = {Factivism Defended: A Reply to Howard},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2025},
volume = {122},
number = {8},
pages = {433--448},
doi = {10.5840/jphil2025122820}
}
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