Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate
The Journal of Philosophy · 2025 · 122 (8) · 405-432
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2025122819 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von Rohan Sud. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others—they do better or worse at “carving nature at its joints.” Call this claim predicate naturalism. Disagreement remains over whether the notion of naturalness extends “beyond the predicate'” (à la Sider, 2011). Are the candidate meanings of logical vocabulary also more or less natural? Call this claim logical naturalism. One motivation for predicate naturalism comes from its supposed ability to help rebut various radical indeterminacy arguments associated with Hilary Putnam (1977, 1980, 1981). It does so in combination with a popular meta-semantic theory called reference magnetism. I argue that the same threats of Putnam-style radical indeterminacy rearise for proponents of predicate naturalism—threats that logical naturalism helps rebut. So, if we accept predicate naturalism because it helps fend off threats of indeterminacy, we should also accept logical naturalism.
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APA
Sud, R. (2025). Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate. The Journal of Philosophy, 122(8), 405-432. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2025122819
Vancouver
Sud R. Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate. The Journal of Philosophy. 2025;122(8):405-432. doi:10.5840/jphil2025122819
BibTeX
@article{Sud2025,
author = {Sud, Rohan},
title = {Reference Magnetism Beyond the Predicate},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2025},
volume = {122},
number = {8},
pages = {405--432},
doi = {10.5840/jphil2025122819}
}
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