Wronging Oneself
The Journal of Philosophy · 2024 · 121 (4) · 181-207
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2024121416 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2024. Verfasst von Daniel Muñoz und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
When, if ever, do we wrong ourselves? The Self-Other Symmetric answer is: when we do to ourselves what would wrong a consenting other. The standard objection, which has gone unchallenged for decades, is that Symmetry seems to imply that we wrong ourselves in too many cases—where rights are unwaivable, or “self-consent” is lacking. I argue that Symmetry not only survives these would-be counterexamples; it explains and unifies them. The key to Symmetry is not, as critics have supposed, the bizarre claim that we must literally give ourselves consent if we are to avoid wronging ourselves. Instead, it is that we authorize ourselves simply by making decisions, just as we can authorize others by making decisions jointly.
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APA
Muñoz, D., & Baron-Schmitt, N. (2024). Wronging Oneself. The Journal of Philosophy, 121(4), 181-207. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2024121416
Vancouver
Muñoz D, Baron-Schmitt N. Wronging Oneself. The Journal of Philosophy. 2024;121(4):181-207. doi:10.5840/jphil2024121416
BibTeX
@article{Muoz2024,
author = {Muñoz, Daniel and Baron-Schmitt, Nathaniel},
title = {Wronging Oneself},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2024},
volume = {121},
number = {4},
pages = {181--207},
doi = {10.5840/jphil2024121416}
}
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