Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity
The Journal of Philosophy · 2022 · 119 (10) · 517-541
DOI: 10.5840/jphil20221191034 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2022. Verfasst von Jared Warren. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In the mid twentieth century, logical positivists and many other philosophers endorsed a simple equation: something was necessary just in case it was analytic just in case it was a priori. Kripke’s examples of a posteriori necessary truths showed that the simple equation is false. But while positivist-style inferentialist approaches to logic and mathematics remain popular, there is no inferentialist account of necessity a posteriori. I give such an account. This sounds like an anti-Kripkean project, but it is not. Some of Kripke’s remarks even suggest this kind of approach. This inferentialist approach reinstates neither the simple equation nor pure conventionalism about necessity a posteriori. But it does lead to something near enough, a type of impure conventionalism. In recent years, metaphysically heavyweight approaches to modality have been popular, while other approaches have lagged behind. The inferentialist, impure conventionalist theory of necessity I describe aims to provide a metaphysically lightweight option in modal metaphysics.
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APA
Warren, J. (2022). Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity. The Journal of Philosophy, 119(10), 517-541. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20221191034
Vancouver
Warren J. Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity. The Journal of Philosophy. 2022;119(10):517-541. doi:10.5840/jphil20221191034
BibTeX
@article{Warren2022,
author = {Warren, Jared},
title = {Inferentialism, Conventionalism, and A Posteriori Necessity},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
year = {2022},
volume = {119},
number = {10},
pages = {517--541},
doi = {10.5840/jphil20221191034}
}
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