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New and Improvable Lives

Joe Horton

The Journal of Philosophy · 2021 · 118 (9) · 486-503

DOI: 10.5840/jphil2021118934 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2021. Verfasst von Joe Horton. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 14-mal zitiert (Crossref).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

According to weak utilitarianism, at least when other things are equal, you should maximize the sum of well-being. This view has considerable explanatory power, but it also has two implications that seem to me implausible. First, it implies that, other things equal, it is wrong to harm yourself, or even to deny yourself benefits. Second, it implies that, other things equal, given the opportunity to create new happy people, it is wrong not to. These implications can be avoided by accepting a complaints-based alternative to weak utilitarianism. However, complaints-based views face two decisive problems, originally noticed by Jacob Ross. I here develop a view that avoids these problems while retaining the advantages of complaints-based views.

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APA

Horton, J. (2021). New and Improvable Lives. The Journal of Philosophy, 118(9), 486-503. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118934

Vancouver

Horton J. New and Improvable Lives. The Journal of Philosophy. 2021;118(9):486-503. doi:10.5840/jphil2021118934

BibTeX
@article{Horton2021,
  author = {Horton, Joe},
  title = {New and Improvable Lives},
  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2021},
  volume = {118},
  number = {9},
  pages = {486--503},
  doi = {10.5840/jphil2021118934}
}
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