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Principles of Indifference

Benjamin Eva

The Journal of Philosophy · 2019 · 116 (7) · 390-411

DOI: 10.5840/jphil2019116724 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy, 2019. Verfasst von Benjamin Eva. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 32-mal zitiert (Crossref).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

The principle of indifference (PI) states that in the absence of any relevant evidence, a rational agent will distribute their credence equally among all the possible outcomes under consideration. Despite its intuitive plausibility, PI famously falls prey to paradox, and so is widely rejected as a principle of ideal rationality. In this article, I present a novel rehabilitation of PI in terms of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgments. In particular, I consider two natural comparative reformulations of PI and argue that while one of them prescribes the adoption of patently irrational epistemic states, the other (which is only available when we drop the standard but controversial “Opinionation” assumption from the comparative confidence framework) provides a consistent formulation of PI that overcomes the most salient limitations of existing formulations.

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APA

Eva, B. (2019). Principles of Indifference. The Journal of Philosophy, 116(7), 390-411. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116724

Vancouver

Eva B. Principles of Indifference. The Journal of Philosophy. 2019;116(7):390-411. doi:10.5840/jphil2019116724

BibTeX
@article{Eva2019,
  author = {Eva, Benjamin},
  title = {Principles of Indifference},
  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2019},
  volume = {116},
  number = {7},
  pages = {390--411},
  doi = {10.5840/jphil2019116724}
}
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