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Chronic Pain, Mere-Differences, and Disability Variantism

Thomas Nadelhoffer

The Journal of Philosophy of Disability · 2022

DOI: 10.5840/jpd20223110 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy of Disability, 2022. Verfasst von Thomas Nadelhoffer. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

While some philosophers believe disabilities constitute a “bad-difference,” others think they constitute a “mere-difference” (Barnes 2016). On this latter view, while disabilities may create certain hardships, having a disability is not bad in itself. I argue that chronic pain problematizes this disability-neutral view. In doing so, I first survey the literature on chronic pain (§1). Then, I argue that Barnes’s mere-difference view cannot adequately accommodate the lived experiences of many people who suffer from chronic pain (§2). Next, I consider two ways Barnes might respond and I explain why these responses are not workable (§3). Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of disability variantism, the view that just as some disabilities can be neutral or even positive for some individuals, other disabilities like chronic pain can understandably make some people’s lives miserable not because society has failed them but simply because some conditions can openly conflict with well-being (§4).

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APA

Nadelhoffer, T. (2022). Chronic Pain, Mere-Differences, and Disability Variantism. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpd20223110

Vancouver

Nadelhoffer T. Chronic Pain, Mere-Differences, and Disability Variantism. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability. 2022. doi:10.5840/jpd20223110

BibTeX
@article{Nadelhoffer2022,
  author = {Nadelhoffer, Thomas},
  title = {Chronic Pain, Mere-Differences, and Disability Variantism},
  journal = {The Journal of Philosophy of Disability},
  year = {2022},
  doi = {10.5840/jpd20223110}
}
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