How Should (and Shouldn’t) We Think About Profound Intellectual Disability?
The Journal of Philosophy of Disability · 2022
DOI: 10.5840/jpd2022102517 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy of Disability, 2022. Verfasst von Ally Peabody Smith. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many accounts of the grounds for human moral standing rely on the possession of higher-order capacities of mind that serve as status-conferring attributes, to the exclusion of those with significant intellectual impairments. Interconnectedly, our relationships with those with profound intellectual disability (PID) remain beneath their potential. Taking as a starting point Peter Singer’s graduated account of moral status, its assumptions about PID, and its implications for what we owe those with PID, I argue that rather than conceptualizing PIDs as severe cognitive deficit, we should characterize them as disabilities marked by the impossibility of successful, mutual linguistic communication. Considering existing relationships between non-PID and PID pairs, I center the potential for atypical forms of communication. I close with the beginnings of a more extensionally adequate grounds for moral status, where moral standing is a product of one’s being able to participate in the shared activity of developing and deepening relationships.
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APA
Smith, A. P. (2022). How Should (and Shouldn’t) We Think About Profound Intellectual Disability?. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpd2022102517
Vancouver
Smith AP. How Should (and Shouldn’t) We Think About Profound Intellectual Disability?. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability. 2022. doi:10.5840/jpd2022102517
BibTeX
@article{Smith2022,
author = {Smith, Ally Peabody},
title = {How Should (and Shouldn’t) We Think About Profound Intellectual Disability?},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy of Disability},
year = {2022},
doi = {10.5840/jpd2022102517}
}
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