Why Human Difference is Critical to a Conception of Moral Standing
The Journal of Philosophy of Disability · 2021
DOI: 10.5840/jpd20211199 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Philosophy of Disability, 2021. Verfasst von Eva Feder Kittay. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I argue that the claim that merely being born of two human beings in a condition that supports life is sufficient for full moral status. Not only ought we not to exclude any human being from full moral status because they lack the possession of what some have deemed to be morally relevant properties, we don’t have a full grasp of what is morally relevant unless we include the many different possible lives humans live in their diverse bodies and minds. Our understanding of how we ought to treat nonhuman beings is not of lesser importance, but it necessarily depends on how we understand what is morally significant in human lives.
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APA
Kittay, E. F. (2021). Why Human Difference is Critical to a Conception of Moral Standing. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpd20211199
Vancouver
Kittay EF. Why Human Difference is Critical to a Conception of Moral Standing. The Journal of Philosophy of Disability. 2021. doi:10.5840/jpd20211199
BibTeX
@article{Kittay2021,
author = {Kittay, Eva Feder},
title = {Why Human Difference is Critical to a Conception of Moral Standing},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy of Disability},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.5840/jpd20211199}
}
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