Hume’s Legacy and the Curate’s Egg
International Philosophical Quarterly · 2025 · 65 (1) · 103-115
DOI: 10.5840/ipq2025651268 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Philosophical Quarterly, 2025. Verfasst von Mark Nelson.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
An important part of the Humean legacy in metaethics would be unacceptable to Hume himself, viz., the argument for moral non-cognitivism based on Humean moral psychology: This argument would be unacceptable to Hume because it requires the premise of motivational internalism: “Necessarily, if one judges an act right, then one is motivated to act in accordance with that judgment.” This asserts a universal, necessary connection between an agent’s moral judging and that agent’s being motivated to act accordingly, but this violates Hume’s claim that the only true propositions asserting universal, necessary connections are about “relations of ideas.” But motivational internalism cannot be about relations of ideas, because it fails the contradiction test in “Hume’s Fork.”
Zitieren
APA
Nelson, M. (2025). Hume’s Legacy and the Curate’s Egg. International Philosophical Quarterly, 65(1), 103-115. https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq2025651268
Vancouver
Nelson M. Hume’s Legacy and the Curate’s Egg. International Philosophical Quarterly. 2025;65(1):103-115. doi:10.5840/ipq2025651268
BibTeX
@article{Nelson2025,
author = {Nelson, Mark},
title = {Hume’s Legacy and the Curate’s Egg},
journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2025},
volume = {65},
number = {1},
pages = {103--115},
doi = {10.5840/ipq2025651268}
}
EUVIMED