Kant and the Necessity of Imagination
International Philosophical Quarterly · 2025 · 65 (1) · 91-102
DOI: 10.5840/ipq2025651267 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Philosophical Quarterly, 2025. Verfasst von Richard Neels.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
It is well-known that Kant at some point thought the faculty of imagination was a necessary and autonomous faculty of the mind working in conjunction with sensibility and understanding to perform cognition. However, many scholars in the last 50 years have argued that Kant abandoned this view of the imagination and relegated its activities to the faculty of the understanding. In this paper, I join some recent scholars in pushing back against this view. I argue that the role of imagination in the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason requires it to perform the necessary task of mediating between the non-conceptual intuitions of the sensibility and the concepts of the understanding. I argue that imagination cannot do this if it is the performance of the faculty of the understanding. Hence, it must be a faculty distinct from the understanding. I also explore how the schemata are initially generated by the imagination and later refined by the concepts of the understanding.
Zitieren
APA
Neels, R. (2025). Kant and the Necessity of Imagination. International Philosophical Quarterly, 65(1), 91-102. https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq2025651267
Vancouver
Neels R. Kant and the Necessity of Imagination. International Philosophical Quarterly. 2025;65(1):91-102. doi:10.5840/ipq2025651267
BibTeX
@article{Neels2025,
author = {Neels, Richard},
title = {Kant and the Necessity of Imagination},
journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2025},
volume = {65},
number = {1},
pages = {91--102},
doi = {10.5840/ipq2025651267}
}
EUVIMED