Negation in Kant’s Ideal of Pure Reason
Idealistic Studies · 2026 · 56 (3) · 299-316
DOI: 10.5840/idstudies2026914202 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Idealistic Studies, 2026. Verfasst von Pablo Genazzano. Die Arbeit nennt 5 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article examines why Kant denies positive transcendental value to negations in the Ideal of Pure Reason. I argue that transcendental negations lack reality because transcendental reality is constructed analytically through the principle of non-contradiction. I distinguish three types of negation: logical negation has neither reality nor content; real negation possesses both within experience; transcendental negation has a priori content but no reality. Kant recognizes real negations in the empirical world, but denies them at the transcendental level: since opposition there must be thought a priori, it can only be logical, and a real negation would collapse the highest being, the totality of all possible determinations (ens realissimum), into contradiction. Transcendental negation is thus only a lack, presupposing the affirmation of this All of reality.
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APA
Genazzano, P. (2026). Negation in Kant’s Ideal of Pure Reason. Idealistic Studies, 56(3), 299-316. https://doi.org/10.5840/idstudies2026914202
Vancouver
Genazzano P. Negation in Kant’s Ideal of Pure Reason. Idealistic Studies. 2026;56(3):299-316. doi:10.5840/idstudies2026914202
BibTeX
@article{Genazzano2026,
author = {Genazzano, Pablo},
title = {Negation in Kant’s Ideal of Pure Reason},
journal = {Idealistic Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {56},
number = {3},
pages = {299--316},
doi = {10.5840/idstudies2026914202}
}
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