Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Semiretributivism
The Harvard Review of Philosophy · 2023 · 30 · 37-62
DOI: 10.5840/harvardreview20239150 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 2023. Verfasst von John Martin Fischer. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Moral responsibility skepticism has traditionally been dismissed as a nonstarter, but because of the important work of Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and others, it has become increasingly influential. I lay out this doctrine, and I subject it to critical scrutiny. I argue that the metaphysical arguments about free will do not yield the result that we do not deserve (in a “basic” sense) the attitudes and actions definitive of moral responsibility. Further, I argue that skepticism leaves out crucial components of our considered views about moral responsibility, making it seriously problematic.
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APA
Fischer, J. M. (2023). Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Semiretributivism. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 30, 37-62. https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20239150
Vancouver
Fischer JM. Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Semiretributivism. The Harvard Review of Philosophy. 2023;30:37-62. doi:10.5840/harvardreview20239150
BibTeX
@article{Fischer2023,
author = {Fischer, John Martin},
title = {Moral Responsibility Skepticism and Semiretributivism},
journal = {The Harvard Review of Philosophy},
year = {2023},
volume = {30},
pages = {37--62},
doi = {10.5840/harvardreview20239150}
}
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