Narrative as a Cognitive Instrument
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science · 2026 · 63 (2) · 135-153
DOI: 10.5840/eps202663229 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2026. Verfasst von Alexandra B. Anikina.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article examines the grounds for determining whether narrative can be recognized, following L. Mink, as a legitimate instrument of cognition. The primary obstacle to such recognition lies in the claim that while narratives, like scientific hypotheses, are the result of productive imagination, narrative interpretations – unlike hypotheses – cannot be confirmed or falsified. Individual statements may be verified, but a narrative is not reducible to the sum of its statements. The article demonstrates that Mink’s understanding of narrative can be developed by drawing on the analytical approach of A. Danto and the hermeneutic approach of P. Ricoeur. In this light, narrative emerges as a complex intellectual construct whose core consists in the representation of processes. The hypothesis advanced is that narrative as an instrument of cognition constitutes a highly organized form of hypothesis, one that enables the conceptualization of multifactorial, self-reinforcing processes of development within human communities.
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APA
Anikina, A. B. (2026). Narrative as a Cognitive Instrument. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 63(2), 135-153. https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202663229
Vancouver
Anikina AB. Narrative as a Cognitive Instrument. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 2026;63(2):135-153. doi:10.5840/eps202663229
BibTeX
@article{Anikina2026,
author = {Anikina, Alexandra B.},
title = {Narrative as a Cognitive Instrument},
journal = {Epistemology & Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
volume = {63},
number = {2},
pages = {135--153},
doi = {10.5840/eps202663229}
}
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