What Are We to Do with Subjectivity?
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science · 2026 · 63 (1) · 48-51
DOI: 10.5840/eps20266315 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2026. Verfasst von Keith Frankish.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Subjectivity presents a challenging puzzle at the intersection of neuroscience and philosophy. While minds can be understood as biological systems evolved to regulate bodily processes and guide adaptive action, their subjective nature remains elusive. Perconti highlights that, although aspects of subjectivity are functionally characterizable, our minds appear to possess intrinsic qualities, qualia, which defy third-person description. His cognitive social theory posits that self-consciousness evolved from social cognition, emphasizing the role of introspective illusions. This theory suggests that our inner worlds, though seemingly metaphysically unique, are products of complex brain functions. A rethinking of subjectivity, which sheds assumptions of intrinsic human specialness, could lead to a comprehensive understanding of consciousness.
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APA
Frankish, K. (2026). What Are We to Do with Subjectivity?. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 63(1), 48-51. https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20266315
Vancouver
Frankish K. What Are We to Do with Subjectivity?. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 2026;63(1):48-51. doi:10.5840/eps20266315
BibTeX
@article{Frankish2026,
author = {Frankish, Keith},
title = {What Are We to Do with Subjectivity?},
journal = {Epistemology & Philosophy of Science},
year = {2026},
volume = {63},
number = {1},
pages = {48--51},
doi = {10.5840/eps20266315}
}
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