EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

The Problem of Moral Choice under Conditions of Uncertainty

Alexey Z. Chernyak

Epistemology & Philosophy of Science · 2026 · 63 (1) · 104-124

DOI: 10.5840/eps202663111 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2026. Verfasst von Alexey Z. Chernyak.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

One of the important questions in contemporary moral philosophy is how to make moral decisions under conditions of moral uncertainty, that is, when it is not entirely clear what the moral outlook endorsed by an agent requires of them in a particular case, or which moral requirements it is right to follow. At least three decision-making principles can be applied in such situations: the principle of plausibility, the principle of truth, and the principle of maximization of expected utility. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages. The principle of truth, which requires acting in accordance with what is objectively true, is simply inapplicable in its pure form. The principle of plausibility is excessively subjective. For this reason, many favor the principle of maximization of expected utility. However, this principle is represented by different versions, and choosing among them is itself far from straightforward. The article pays particular attention to a version of this principle known as the principle of maximizing the expected moral value of an action. Despite the criticisms directed at it, its application is, on the whole, justified in many cases. Yet there is another dimension of moral uncertainty that, in my view, significantly limits the effectiveness of this principle, as well as of any other. The point is that even such parameters fundamental to moral choice as the aim of moral action and the method of moral evaluation of expected outcomes are often not strictly specified, and need not be specified by the theories that an agent takes to be true or worthy of consideration. In such situations, the advantage accrues to those who have the clearest ethical priorities. This, however, does not imply that the solution to the problem of moral uncertainty consists in reducing all types of moral agents to committed adherents of a particular moral system; rather, it points to the need for a more serious approach to moral education, for broadening the scope of ethical reflection, and for the critical examination of one’s own moral commitments.

Zitieren

APA

Chernyak, A. Z. (2026). The Problem of Moral Choice under Conditions of Uncertainty. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 63(1), 104-124. https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202663111

Vancouver

Chernyak AZ. The Problem of Moral Choice under Conditions of Uncertainty. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 2026;63(1):104-124. doi:10.5840/eps202663111

BibTeX
@article{Chernyak2026,
  author = {Chernyak, Alexey Z.},
  title = {The Problem of Moral Choice under Conditions of Uncertainty},
  journal = {Epistemology & Philosophy of Science},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {63},
  number = {1},
  pages = {104--124},
  doi = {10.5840/eps202663111}
}
Kostenlos starten →