The Non-Fundamentality of Minor Premises
Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy · 2026 · 30 (2) · 233-244
DOI: 10.5840/epoche2026312286 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2026. Verfasst von David Botting. Die Arbeit nennt 3 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper I want to show that there are two features of first principles that do not seem always to hold of minor premises, and thus two reasons to think that demonstrative minor premises are not first principles: minor premises are not always known prior to conclusions, and knowledge of minor premises is not noûs.
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APA
Botting, D. (2026). The Non-Fundamentality of Minor Premises. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 30(2), 233-244. https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche2026312286
Vancouver
Botting D. The Non-Fundamentality of Minor Premises. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy. 2026;30(2):233-244. doi:10.5840/epoche2026312286
BibTeX
@article{Botting2026,
author = {Botting, David},
title = {The Non-Fundamentality of Minor Premises},
journal = {Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {30},
number = {2},
pages = {233--244},
doi = {10.5840/epoche2026312286}
}
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