Kagan’s Moral Status View, the Problem of Normal Variation, and Incommensurability
Essays in Philosophy · 2025 · 26 (1) · 71-79
DOI: 10.5840/eip202526122 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Essays in Philosophy, 2025. Verfasst von Sabina Schrynemakers.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In How to Count Animals, More or Less Shelly Kagan argues that the welfare of those withgreater psychological capacities counts more in what is overall morally best than the same amount of welfare of those with lesser capacities. He raises and replies to what he calls the “Problem of Normal Variation” objection that his view implies those with slightly greater cognitive capacities have slightly greater such moral status, so that, for example, the welfare of slightly more intelligent humans is slightly more morally important. I argue that due to the indeterminacy of which specific trade-offs between specific amounts of welfare and harm are morally best, the notion of moral status is inherently vague, so there is no Problem of Normal Variation for Kagan’s view. Moral status can depend on psychological capacity without varying within the range of ordinary human capacities.
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APA
Schrynemakers, S. (2025). Kagan’s Moral Status View, the Problem of Normal Variation, and Incommensurability. Essays in Philosophy, 26(1), 71-79. https://doi.org/10.5840/eip202526122
Vancouver
Schrynemakers S. Kagan’s Moral Status View, the Problem of Normal Variation, and Incommensurability. Essays in Philosophy. 2025;26(1):71-79. doi:10.5840/eip202526122
BibTeX
@article{Schrynemakers2025,
author = {Schrynemakers, Sabina},
title = {Kagan’s Moral Status View, the Problem of Normal Variation, and Incommensurability},
journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
year = {2025},
volume = {26},
number = {1},
pages = {71--79},
doi = {10.5840/eip202526122}
}
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