Il potere morale del volto del bambino
Chiasmi International · 2025 · 27 · 373-388
DOI: 10.5840/chiasmi20252719 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Chiasmi International, 2025. Verfasst von Patrick Burk.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
One of the major programs of UNICEF is called “Adjustment with a Human Face”. It argues that any ‘model’ for the economic, industrial, and military development of third world countries is justified only if it is applied with a human face, with a profound moral sensitivity to the needs and rights of all persons, as expressed in the face of the child. But the problem which UNICEF confronts theoretically and practically in this project would seeem to the be absence of, and the consequent need for, a theory of the person as OTHER on which to ground any claim for the irreducible moral worth of children. If UNICEF were to consult certain philosophies, such as British empiricism or transcendental phenomenology, it may find only various and subtle forms of the forgetfulness of the face of the child. The purpose of the present essay is to focus on the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to see if we can find there a theory of intersubjectivity and the foundation of human rights commensurate with UNICEF’s program for justice in our world. Merleau-Ponty offers two arguments for the person as other. The first is a genetic argument, showing that otherness is a constitutive dimension of personhood. The second is a phenomenologicl argument centered on the reversibility of the touching and the touched, of subject and object, wherein the person as other is given in an originary way. These arguments will be examined in the light of two texts, written in the 1980’s and signed by Emmanuel Levinas, which would question whether the social relation and/or the ethical relation could be established through intercorporeity. In these essays, Levinas argues, contrary to Merleau-Ponty, that the ethical relation is beyond knowledge and within the modality of the gift. Is it to Levinas, then, rather than to Merleau-Ponty that UNICEF should turn to find the philosophical framework adequate to its commitment to the moral power of the face of the child? Contrary to Levinas, this essay purports to demonstrate that a) Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility schema does not preclude affirmation of what is irreducibly other in the Other but provides the common ground, lacking in Levinas, for ethical communication, and that b)if ‘the gift’ is ever to be received, the ethical relation will have to be conceived in terms of what Merleau-Ponty understands by a ‘humanism in extension’ and ‘Virtu’. Thus, as part of its heritage, Merleau-Ponty’s thought can form the theoretical and practical foundation for UNICEF’s commitment to the moral power of the face of the child.
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APA
Burk, P. (2025). Il potere morale del volto del bambino. Chiasmi International, 27, 373-388. https://doi.org/10.5840/chiasmi20252719
Vancouver
Burk P. Il potere morale del volto del bambino. Chiasmi International. 2025;27:373-388. doi:10.5840/chiasmi20252719
BibTeX
@article{Burk2025,
author = {Burk, Patrick},
title = {Il potere morale del volto del bambino},
journal = {Chiasmi International},
year = {2025},
volume = {27},
pages = {373--388},
doi = {10.5840/chiasmi20252719}
}
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