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On Two Accounts of Misunderstanding

Stefan Petkov

Balkan Journal of Philosophy · 2026 · 18 (1) · 66-85

DOI: 10.5840/bjp20261815 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2026. Verfasst von Stefan Petkov.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

When developing theories of understanding, philosophers have tried to provide a full package by offering criteria both for the epistemic success of understanding and for various related epistemic failures. One of those failures is misunderstanding. Currently, there are only two theories of misunderstanding. The first one, from Yu and Petkov, analyzes the unique epistemic conditions for misunderstanding. The other one, by Rice and Khalifa, studies the process of correcting misunderstanding. In this paper, I show that both theories have shortcomings. I argue that Rice and Khalifa’s theory is too broad and permissive. It effectively blurs existing distinctions between proto-understanding or understanding based on falsified theories. The reverse holds for Yu and Petkov’s theory. It is too narrow and thus fails to capture broad issues related to clearing misunderstanding. I conclude by suggesting that Yu and Petkov’s theory describes misunderstanding more plausibly, whilst Rice and Khalifa’s theory can capture the correction of misunderstanding.

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APA

Petkov, S. (2026). On Two Accounts of Misunderstanding. Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 18(1), 66-85. https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp20261815

Vancouver

Petkov S. On Two Accounts of Misunderstanding. Balkan Journal of Philosophy. 2026;18(1):66-85. doi:10.5840/bjp20261815

BibTeX
@article{Petkov2026,
  author = {Petkov, Stefan},
  title = {On Two Accounts of Misunderstanding},
  journal = {Balkan Journal of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {1},
  pages = {66--85},
  doi = {10.5840/bjp20261815}
}
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