Forward-Secure Blockchain Architecture for National-Scale Electronic Voting: Enhancing Institutional Sustainability and Democratic Resilience
IPSI Transactions on Internet Research · 01.07.2026 · 22 (3) · 30
DOI: 10.58245/ipsi.tir.2603.04 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift IPSI Transactions on Internet Research, online erschienen am 01.07.2026. Verfasst von Nebojša Stanojević und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 65 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
National electronic voting systems require robust auditability, non-repudiation, forward secrecy, and fault tolerance under predictable but highly variable workloads. Existing protocols within permissioned blockchain networks usually favor low latency or long-lasting identities of business entities, which are assumptions that do not fully correspond to adversarial election environments. This paper presents a feasibility study of a time-slotbased permissioned blockchain architecture designed for state elections involving semi-trusted but mutually adversarial validators. The basic mechanism of the system is a block authentication scheme with advanced security, based on ephemeral key pairs: validators publish the public key for block N+1 within block N, after which they use the corresponding private key once to sign the next block and immediately delete it permanently. As part of the research, a multi-node prototype was implemented as a customized infrastructure of permissioned blockchain in the Node.js environment, with the application of Ed25519 digital signatures, explicit block finalization, peer-to-peer communication between validators and full signature verification by all participants. Empirical evaluation in a simulated wide-area network (WAN) environment shows a stable throughput of approximately 274 transactions per second, with a median finalization (p50) of 10.7 seconds and a 99th percentile (p99) of under 21 seconds. A projection on an election scenario involving six million voters during the 13:00 voting period indicates an average safety factor load of approximately 2.1. The presented results of the proposed model should be interpreted as a proof of concept obtained in a controlled prototype environment, and not as a complete validation of the production capacity on a geographically distributed election infrastructure. The findings indicate technical feasibility under defined assumptions and demonstrate how domain-specific transaction clustering, ephemeral key authentication, and explicit validator signatures can support an auditable consensus layer for electronic voting. Out of scope for this current study are client-side privacy protection, coercion resistance, and full end-to-end ballot secrecy. Our structural architecture explicitly hardens the consensus and ledger layers instead.
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APA
Stanojević, N., Vukmirović, D., Čomić, T., Stanojević, D., & Ćetković, M. (2026). Forward-Secure Blockchain Architecture for National-Scale Electronic Voting: Enhancing Institutional Sustainability and Democratic Resilience. IPSI Transactions on Internet Research, 22(3), 30. https://doi.org/10.58245/ipsi.tir.2603.04
Vancouver
Stanojević N, Vukmirović D, Čomić T, Stanojević D, Ćetković M. Forward-Secure Blockchain Architecture for National-Scale Electronic Voting: Enhancing Institutional Sustainability and Democratic Resilience. IPSI Transactions on Internet Research. 2026;22(3):30. doi:10.58245/ipsi.tir.2603.04
BibTeX
@article{Stanojevi2026,
author = {Stanojević, Nebojša and Vukmirović, Dragan and Čomić, Tijana and Stanojević, Dejan and Ćetković, Miloš},
title = {Forward-Secure Blockchain Architecture for National-Scale Electronic Voting: Enhancing Institutional Sustainability and Democratic Resilience},
journal = {IPSI Transactions on Internet Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {22},
number = {3},
pages = {30},
doi = {10.58245/ipsi.tir.2603.04}
}
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