LOGARITHMIC MARKETS CORING RULES FOR MODULAR COMBINATORIAL INFORMATION AGGREGATION
The Journal of Prediction Markets · 13.12.2012 · 1 (1) · 3-15
DOI: 10.5750/jpm.v1i1.417 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Prediction Markets, online erschienen am 13.12.2012. Verfasst von Robin Hanson. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 172-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. Regarding a bet on one event given another event, only logarithmic versions preserve the probability of the given event. Logarithmic versions also preserve the conditional probabilities of other events, and so preserve conditional independence relations. Given logarithmic rules that elicit relative probabilities of base event pairs, it costs no more to elicit estimates on all combinations of these base events.
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APA
Hanson, R. (2012). LOGARITHMIC MARKETS CORING RULES FOR MODULAR COMBINATORIAL INFORMATION AGGREGATION. The Journal of Prediction Markets, 1(1), 3-15. https://doi.org/10.5750/jpm.v1i1.417
Vancouver
Hanson R. LOGARITHMIC MARKETS CORING RULES FOR MODULAR COMBINATORIAL INFORMATION AGGREGATION. The Journal of Prediction Markets. 2012;1(1):3-15. doi:10.5750/jpm.v1i1.417
BibTeX
@article{Hanson2012,
author = {Hanson, Robin},
title = {LOGARITHMIC MARKETS CORING RULES FOR MODULAR COMBINATORIAL INFORMATION AGGREGATION},
journal = {The Journal of Prediction Markets},
year = {2012},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
pages = {3--15},
doi = {10.5750/jpm.v1i1.417}
}
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