A Multi-Plane Detection Framework for Quantum-Enabled Cryptographic Attacks: Operationalizing the Detection of Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later Activity and Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptography
CyberSystem Journal · 24.06.2026 · 3 (1) · 1-11
DOI: 10.57238/csj.2026.1021 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift CyberSystem Journal, online erschienen am 24.06.2026. Verfasst von K G Kharade und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) poses a fundamental threat to public-key cryptography securing modern digital communications. The most immediate danger is not direct decryption but the harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) attack, wherein adversaries passively collect and archive encrypted traffic today for retrospective decryption once a CRQC becomes operational. This threat is structurally difficult to counter because the collection phase generates no host- or account-level signals detectable by conventional intrusion-detection systems.Simultaneously, migration to NIST-standardized post-quantum cryptography (PQC) specifically ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) introduces new vulnerabilities, including chosen-ciphertext side-channel attacks, fault-injection attacks, and protocol downgrade attacks arising during hybrid deployment periods.Existing security tooling addresses cryptographic inventory, encrypted-traffic anomaly detection, and PQC readiness as isolated problems, leaving a critical operational gap. To address this, we propose QCAD (Quantum Cryptographic Attack Detection), a unified multi-plane detection framework integrating four complementary detection planes: (A) flow-metadata behavioral analytics targeting HNDL collection indicators; (B) host- and protocol-level telemetry for PQC implementation flaws and downgrade attacks; (C) continuous crypto-agility monitoring with per-asset Mosca-inequality risk scoring; and (D) quantum-vulnerable deception canaries. These planes feed a unified correlation layer that maps observations to MITRE ATT&CK techniques and produces risk-ranked alerts.Evaluation against synthetic HNDL and PQC-attack benchmarks demonstrates that cross-plane fusion achieves a recall of 0.97 at a 5% false-positive rate (F1 = 0.90, ROC-AUC = 0.99), substantially outperforming any individual plane, confirming that no single observable captures all attack families.A key boundary condition remains: HNDL detection is inherently a probabilistic behavioral-inference problem, and interception occurring on transit infrastructure beyond the defender's perimeter may remain undetectable regardless of sensor deployment.
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APA
Kharade, K. G., K.Vengatesan, & Algabri, H. K. (2026). A Multi-Plane Detection Framework for Quantum-Enabled Cryptographic Attacks: Operationalizing the Detection of Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later Activity and Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptography. CyberSystem Journal, 3(1), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.57238/csj.2026.1021
Vancouver
Kharade KG, K.Vengatesan, Algabri HK. A Multi-Plane Detection Framework for Quantum-Enabled Cryptographic Attacks: Operationalizing the Detection of Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later Activity and Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptography. CyberSystem Journal. 2026;3(1):1-11. doi:10.57238/csj.2026.1021
BibTeX
@article{Kharade2026,
author = {Kharade, K G and K.Vengatesan and Algabri, Hayder Kareem},
title = {A Multi-Plane Detection Framework for Quantum-Enabled Cryptographic Attacks: Operationalizing the Detection of Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later Activity and Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptography},
journal = {CyberSystem Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {3},
number = {1},
pages = {1--11},
doi = {10.57238/csj.2026.1021}
}
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